Stop bashing givenness : a note on Elke Kasimir´s "questions-answers test and givenness" by Weskott, Thomas
Stop Bashing Givenness!
A Note on Elke Kasimir’s “Questions-Answers Test and
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Elke Kasimir’s paper (in this volume) argues against employing the no-
tion of Givenness in the explanation of accent assignment. I will claim
that the arguments against Givenness put forward by Kasimir are in-
conclusive because they beg the question of the role of Givenness. It
is concluded that, more generally, arguments against Givenness as a
diagnostic for information structural partitions should not be accepted
offhand, since the notion of Givenness of discourse referents is (a) the-
oretically simple, (b) readily observable and quantiﬁable, and (c) bears
cognitive signiﬁcance.
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In her paper “Questions-Answers Test and Givenness: Some Question Marks”
(thisvolume),ElkeKasimirarguesagainstthequestion-answertestforfocussed
constituents on the ground that it involves the assumption of “(...) unneces-
sarily complex focus projection rules and focus interpretation rules” (Kasimir,
2005, p. 13)1). In addition to their allegedly unnecessary comlexity, these rules
are incriminated for the fact that they “(...)need additional pragmatic input in
form of a givenness property (...)”(pp.15, 18f.; Kasimir’s emphasis), the addi-
tion of which the author claims to be too high a price to pay (ibd.). Furthermore,
Kasimir claims that an alternative analysis which abandons Givenness as an in-
gredient in the explanation of accent placement makes better predictions for a
∗ Thanks to Elke Kasimir for letting me comment on her paper, as well as for clarifying dis-
cussion. The usual disclaimer holds.
1 Henceforth, all quotes refer to that paper unless indicated otherwise.
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certain class of examples.
While I do not intend to comment on the last claim, and lacking a commonly
agreed upon metric for the complexity of focus projection and/or interpretation
rules that would put me in a position to grapple with the ﬁrst claim, I will only
deal with the second, the argument against the usefulness of Givenness in deter-
mining accent assignment. But before doing so, a disclaimer might be in place. I
assumethatwhatIhavetosayisneutralwithrespecttoKasimir’sﬁrstclaim,i.e.
I assume that my stance on the theoretical and empirical usefulness of the notion
of Givenness is independent of that of the question-answer test. Furthermore, I
take it that none of the following takes sides as regards the issue of which theory
of focus interpretation is to be preferred (e.g., localist vs. globalist accounts, cf.
J¨ ager (2004)). And ﬁnally, I will not try to propose a ﬂeshed-out Givenness-
based account of accent assignment or focus interpretation; for the latter, the
reader is referred to Sauerland (2004), for the former, to Wagner (2005).
Kasimir argues that in order to make use of the question-answer test as a
diagnostic for accent placement, one has to assume focus projection rules and
focus interpretation rules which are said to be unnecessarily complex . As a
further and apparently even more severe drawback, she claims that these rules
need additional pragmatic input from a Givenness property, and that to assume
such additional input is too high a price to pay.
My argument against this position is going to run down the following line:
Firstly, I will show that Kasimir’s critical example holds Givenness in store at
a relatively low price—in fact, that Givenness is for free in this case. Secondly,
I will argue that it is unclear exactly how Kasimir’s alternative strategy, i.e.
to account for the accent placement in this example by recourse to alternative
sets plus a pragmatic rule that restricts the answer set, should work without
appealing to Givenness, and that it indeed necessitates appeal to Givenness justComment on Kasimir 55
as much as the analysis it purports to supersede. I conclude that the argument for
the alternative account and the argument against the Givenness-based account
are equally inconclusive.
My second point will be more general and is concerned with the theoretical
status of the notion of Givenness of discourse referents in determining informa-
tion structural partitions. I will point out that, its shortcomings already revealed
by Reinhart (1981) notwithstanding, it is indispensable as a heuristic for detect-
ing focus-background and topic-comment structures, and that its theoretical as
well as its empirical value lie in its fruitfulness for a cognitive understanding of
the role information structure plays in natural language.
The pair of examples playing the central role in Kasimir’s argument against
a Givenness-based account of accent placement are the following (I stick to
Kasimir’s numbering for convenience): 2
(28) Q. Who owns a bicycle?
A. [This STUdent ]FOC owns a bicycle.
As regards (28), Kasimir notes that the question-answer test (in its context-
sensitive variant) correctly predicts the focus of the answer to be this student,
which ultimately yields the correct accent assignment . This example is con-
trasted with the following:
(29) Q. As for the students: who owns a bicycle?
A. THIS student owns a bicycle.
2 For what follows, I will assume for the sake of argument that Kasimir’s deﬁnitions for accent
placement and the question-answer test as given in the ﬁrst three sections of her paper are
correct—by which statement I do not mean to imply that they are not, but rather that I will
take them for granted.56 Thomas Weskott
The issue Kasimir points to is “(...) that (28.Q) asks for arbitrary bicycle-
owners, whereas (29.Q) is contextually understood to speciﬁcally ask for a DP
which selects from students.“ (p.16). The question is, then, how this difference
can be linked to the differences in requirements on pitch accent placement.
Kasimir offers two logical possibilities: one can either try to account for the dif-
ferences between (28.A) and (29.A) by adjusting the rules for focus projection,
or, and that is Kasimir’s choice, by sticking to the projection rules assumed so
far and ﬁx the problem instead by assuming a different interpretive mechanism
(alternative sets plus a restriction on the set of contextually salient answers).
The relevant sets and the respective focus-background structures of the answers
look like this:
(35) a. contextually appropriate answers to (28.Q):
{ x owns a bicycle | x an individual }
b. contextually appropriate answers to (29.Q):
{ x is one of the students and owns a bicycle | x an individual }
c. [This STUdent]FOC owns a bicycle FOC
{ x owns a bicycle | x an individual }
d.  THISFOC student owns a bicycle FOC
{ x is a student and owns a bicycle | x an individual }
Let us ﬁrst consider the ﬁrst alternative, which Kasimir rejects. The reason
for this rejection is that it involves the adjustment of focus projection rules so
as to respect the property of Givenness (cf. her rule (31), p.17), which is said to
“(...) involve reference to additional pragmatic input (...)” (p.18).
Let me comment on that last point ﬁrst. No matter whether one assumes a
dynamic or a classical interpretation procedure, I take it that establishing theComment on Kasimir 57
relation between the wh-pronoun restricted by the as for-phrase and the subject
of the answer involves no additional input whatsoever, be it semantic or prag-
matic, since the anaphoric relation between the two sets of discourse referents
is just there. So Givenness has not to be stipulated or derived for any price, it
can be had for free. This point can be made even stronger if the question is para-
phrased by the following variant featuring a d-linked wh-pronoun, which does
the same (at least for the issue at hand) as the as for-phrase, viz. to restrict the
domain of the wh-element to the extension of the noun:
(29’) Q. Which student owns a bicycle?
A. THIS student owns a bicycle.
The next question is how the focus projection rules can be made sensitive
to Givenness or the alternative property proposed by Kasimir. According to her,
this alternative works as follows: ﬁrstly, the set of contextually appropriate an-
swers are computed, and so are the alternative sets generated by the respective
answers; the minimal set matching both restrictions then decides which is the
correct focus-background structure, which in turn yields the correct accent as-
signment for the answer. On the Givenness account, the projection rules have
to be made sensitive to the fact that the restrictor of the complex demonstrative
this student is mentioned, presupposed, or inferable from context (cf. p.18).
My worry here is the following: it is crucial to Kasimir’s argument that the
way in which the complex demonstrative this N contributes to the computation
of the alternative sets containing it does not depend on any kind of Givenness
(on pain of begging the question). So obviously it is not sufﬁcient to determine
the meaning and the semantic type of a demonstrative of the form this N (as
Kasimir does on p.24), but one also has to pin down the information structural
properties of such phrases, more speciﬁcally: whether a phrase of the form this
N carries the presupposition that there exists an N. Whatever the theoretical58 Thomas Weskott
stance on this question (s. Lepore & Ludwig (2000) for a discussion), I think
that either answer will ﬁt uncomfortably with Kasimir’s alternative proposal.
That is because if we assume that a complex demonstrative of the form this N
has roughly the logical form
[t h ex:xi sthis and x is N ]
and further assume that the quantiﬁer the x carries an existential and a
uniqueness presupposition which enters into the computation of the alternative
set of an utterance containing it, Kasimir’s alternative proposal will become cor-
rupt because it begs the question of the role of Givenness. On the other hand,
if we assume that no such presupposition is present in the computation of the
alternative sets, the question arises where these sets come from in the ﬁrst place.
If I understand her correctly, Kasimir argues that in order to arrive at the right
kind of alternative sets, she makes use of a notion of Givenness she consid-
ers uncontroversial, namely one that characterizes as given something which is
“(...) corresponding to those parts of a sentence which are not focused, and are
thus common to all focus alternatives.” (p. 34, fn.14).
Now it seems obvious to me that this way of reasoning simply reverses the
order of explanation (a focus-background structure is taken for granted in the
construction of the alternative sets, instead of derived at by taking the latter and
the context into consideration), and hence puts the argument for Kasimir’s al-
ternative account in jeopardy of becoming circular.
Eitherway,IfailtoseeinwhichwayKasimir’salternativeaccountcanmake
sense of the minimization of the superset of the set of contextually appropriate
answers and the alternative sets without relying on some notion of Givenness,
be it one that comes from the presupposition of the question, or one stemming
from the presupposition of the complex demonstrative, or both. Her way of de-
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is at best inconclusive, at worst circular. Moreover, given the straightforward
anaphoric relation between the set denoted by the question and the set denoted
by the focussed part of the answer, I do not see a reason for her reluctance to
employ a notion of Givenness in the derivation of accent placement, its price
not being, as I have argued, high at all.
The reason for discussing Kasimir’s claims with respect to the notion of
Givenness—apart from the formal details criticised above—is as more gen-
eral one: critical evaluations of that notion which are similar in spirit to that
of Kasimir’s (e.g. in Reinhart, 1981, and, more recently, Krifka, 2004, a.o.)
have shown it to be neither sufﬁcient, nor even necessary for the determination
of focus-background and topic-comment structures and, accordingly, accent as-
signment, in various cases. While I certainly do not intend to question these
ﬁndings, I want to raise the issue whether they countervail against the use of that
notion in information structure research in general. My answer to that question
is in the negative, and it is for the following three reasons.
Firstly, I consider the notion of Givenness, for all its shortcomings in some
special cases, to be the simplest observable information structural property of
discoursereferents.Althoughthenotionofanaphoricityisnotunproblematicei-
ther, having an explicit antecedent in context (i.e., being mentioned) is a feature
of natural language expressions that can be detected even by non-linguists. That
alone would, of course, not make it theoretically interesting.3 But, secondly,
properties such as the systematicity of distance of antecedent and anaphoric
element on the one hand, and form of expression (s. e.g. Ariel, 1990) on the
other, as well as the systematic recurrence of given elements in referential (or
topic) chains illustrate the explanatory potential of the notion of Givenness in
3 Although it certainly is a virtue in e.g. instructing naive annotators how to detect information
structural properties of parts of speech in corpora, which would be even more troublesome
an endeavour if one were solely to rely on notions like Relevance, Contrast, Aboutness, etc.60 Thomas Weskott
an exemplary fashion, since both of these properties are quantiﬁable and hence
can be put to empirical test. This brings me to the third point: not only can the
systematicities of Givenness explain certain properties of texts, they moreover
have been shown to be highly effective in the actual production and percep-
tion of natural language (s. Garrod & Sanford, 1994, for an overview). To give
but one recent example: the notion of Givenness has been shown to be crucial
in explaining the data pattern in a series of experiments on the comprehension
of locative inversion constructions, since both effects on reading times found
in these experiments (Relatum=Given, and the well-established Given-before-
New effect) make reference to it (cf. H¨ ornig et al., 2005, and H¨ ornig et al., to
appear; but s.also Clifton & Frazier (2004) for a slightly different view on the
role of Givenness in comprehension).
It is on these grounds that I think arguments against the role of Givenness in
the explanation of information structural partitions should be put under close
scrutiny, and even if Givenness-based explanations of information structural
phenomena were only to be had at a certain price, they may eventually just
be worth it.Comment on Kasimir 61
Bibliography
Clifton, Charles, & Lyn Frazier (2004). Should given information come before
new? Yes and no. Memory and Cognition, 32(6):886–895.
Garrod, Simon & Anthony J. Sanford (1994). Resolving Sentences in a Dis-
course Context: How Discourse Representation Affects Language Under-
standing. In Morton Ann Gernsbacher, editor, Handbook of Psycholinguis-
tics, pages 675–698. Academic Press, New York.
H¨ ornig, Robin, Klaus Oberauer & Andrea Weidenfeld (2005). Two principles
of premise integration in spatial reasoning. Memory & Cognition, 33(1):131–
139.
H¨ ornig, Robin, Thomas Weskott, Reinhold Kliegl & Gisbert Fanselow (to ap-
pear). Word order variation in spatial descriptions with adverbs. Memory &
Cognition.
J¨ ager, Gerhard (2004). Alternatives or presuppositions? A comparison of the
Background-Presupposition Rule with Alternative Semantics. Theoretical
Linguistics, 30(1):111–122.
Kasimir, Elke (2005). Questions-Answers Test and Givenness: Some Question
Marks. In Ishihara, Shinichiro, Michaela Schmitz & Anne Schwarz, editors,
ISIS, vol. 3, pages 1–52. Universit¨ atsverlag, Potsdam.
Krifka, Manfred (2004). The Semantics of Questions and the Focusation of
Answers. InLee, Chungmin,MatthewGordon&Daniel B¨ uring,editor,Topic
and Focus: Cross-linguistic Perspectives on Intonation and Meaning, pages
139–151. Kluwer, Dordrecht.
Lepore, Ernest & Kirk Ludwig (2000). The Semantics and Pragmatics of Com-
plex Demonstratives. Mind, 109.434:199–240.62 Thomas Weskott
Reinhart, Tanya (1981). Pragmatics and Linguistics: An Analysis of Sentence
Topics. Philosophica, 27 (1):53–94.
Wagner, Michael (2005). Givenness and Locality. Handout for a talk held at
University of Potsdam, January 18, 2005.
Thomas Weskott
SFB 632, Project C1
Universit¨ at Potsdam
Postfach 601553
14415 Potsdam
Germany
weskott@uni-potsdam.de
www.sfb632.uni-potsdam.de/homes/weskott/